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NOTES AND COMMENTS
present interpretation of our statute, a fleeing culprit may not only
escape criminal conviction, but also might ultimately regain possession
of his automobile.
Thus the writer suggests that the legislature take cognizance of the
various questions raised from the language of G. S. § 18-6 and the ulti-
mate confusion resulting therefrom, with a view towards clarification, or
better still an adherence to what seems to be the general trend toward
allowing condemnation and forfeiture proceedings without regard to
prior arrest and convictions of the criminal defendant.
THOMAS C. CREASY, JR.
Evidence-Admissibility of Truth Serum Test Results
The Truth Serum Test1 has received practically no judicial recogni-
tion since its recent debut into the truth discovery field. The results of
this test, usually taken voluntarily by the accused, 2 have continually
been excluded by the courts primarily because statements or confessions
made while examinees are under the influence of such drugs as sodium
amytal and sodium pentothol are (1) unreliable,3 (2) self-serving or
feiture, the required burden of proof to support forfeiture is proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
I This term has been frequently applied even though actually misleading, for the
drugs are neither serum, nor do they always produce the "empirical" truth. After
the drug is injected, the patient falls into a state of partial consciousness (twi-
light sleep) and becomes susceptible to interrogation until recovery which usually
requires several hours. The drug eliminates repressive influences and ordinary
restraints which under normal conditions lead to embarrassment and fear. Halluci-
nations in some instances have occurred. After recovery the patient is said to
have no recollection of the transpired interview. The technical label for such an
examination is narcoanalysis. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug- -
duced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L. J. 315 (1953) ; Muehl-
berger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 513 (1951).
'Assuming defendant confesses during drug-induced interview to which he
voluntarily submits, no claim of self-incrimination would bar such confession from
evidence; however, such confessions are at present deemed unreliable, and hence,
inadmissible. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 841 (a) (1940). Evidence obtained from
these interviews or from clues tendered therein, most likely would be admissible
as would confessions given after presentation of test results to the examinee. Note,
62 YALE L. J. 315, 337 (1953) ; STANSBURY, EVIDENCE, § 186 (1946). Tests taken
involuntarily must necessarily raise issues of self-incrimination and illegally ob-
tained confessions. Such confessions will of course be held inadmissible when ex-
tracted while examinee is under the influence of injected drugs. Whether evidence
discovered in such interview or whether confessions induced by test results would
be held admissible will depend upon the laws applicable to particular jurisdictions
in question. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 601 (1946). See, Note 32 N. C L. REv. 98 (1954); 3 WVmmaOam, EvmiE NE§ 859 (1940) ; SrANSBURY, EVIDENCE §§ 182-86 (1946). In regard to due process
see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REV. 683
(1955).
'State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P. 2d 612 (1955) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56
N. M. 257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952) ; Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P. 2d
495 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 898 (1951). See notes 62 YALE L. J. 315
(1953); 46 J. Cii. L., C. & P. S. 259 (1956); annot., 23 A. L. R. 2d 1306
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conjectural, 4 (3) violations of the hearsay rule,5 (4) and once because
no foundation for such evidence had been laid.6
Both legal and medical experts seem to agree that truth drugs, as
such, have not transcended the experimental stages.7  These drugs are
not reliable to the extent that they will force the examinee to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. On the contrary, not
only are some examinees able to retain the deception of fabrication, but
some neurotics are apt to give false confessions.8
When confronted with the truth serum test courts have frequently
referred to Frye v. United States,' where results of a lie-detector test
were offered into evidence for the first time and refused because the
technique had not yet gained the general acceptance of psychiatry, the
particular field in which it belonged.
It remains to be seen however, whether drugs such as sodium amytal
have become sufficiently established in psychiatric medicine to receive
judicial recognition for limited purposes, i.e., foundation material upon
which expert opinions can be based regarding issues of sanity and credi-
bility, as contrasted with the truthfulness of various claims of guilt or
of innocence. It is true that these drugs are currently being utilized by
the medical professions for both analysis and curative treatments.
Whether this will constitute a general acceptance in application of the
Frye test for these limited purposes the courts have not yet fully indi-
cated.
(1952); People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P. 2d 913 (1952) (matter of
court's discretion); and State v. Hudson, 314 Mo. 599, 289 S. W. 920 (1926)
(where such evidence was termed "clap-trap" and as being "unworthy of serious
consideration").
" People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P. 2d 201 (1951) ; People v. McNichol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21 (1950). For disapproval of this rule see
STANSBURY, EvIDENcE § 140 (1946); 52 W. VA. L. REv. 81 (1950).
People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P. 2d 201 (1951) ; People v. McNichol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21 (1950). For application of the hearsay rule
to these cases see 62 YALE L. J. 315, 323-24 (1953).
6 Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S. E. 2d 267 (1950). In rejecting
the evidence the court commented, "The record does not show the drug that was
used or the quantity of it that was administered, nor is there any evidence with
respect to the value or the reliability of the tests. The answers given by the
defendant are at times maudlin and at times obviously self-serving and indicative
of a conscious purpose to avoid self-incrimination."
This case is also interesting from the standpoint of stipulation. The defendant
and state prosecutor agreed that defendant be examined under drugs. The court
refused the evidence because there had been no agreement to allow the results
into evidence, inferring that stipulation agreements would be recognized as in the
lie-detector field. For a stipulation in a lie-detector case see State v. Lowry, 163
Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947); and for validity of stipulation agreements, 46
HARv. L. REv. 138 (1932).
'3 WimoRE, EvrDENcE § 998 (1948) ; 20 Amt. JUR., Evidence § 762 (1939);
annot., 23 A. L. R. 2d 1308 (1952).
846 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 259 (1956); 62 YALE L. J. 315 (1953). Contra
42 J. CRIM. L., C & P. S. 513 (1952).
p293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
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In People v. Esposito, ° the defendants pleaded insanity to the charge
of murder. Upon their own motion they were committed to the observa-
tion of court appointed psychiatrists, who in the course of the examina-
tion injected metrazol and sodium amytal. After proof that such drugs
were frequently used in psychiatric examinations, one psychiatrist was
permitted to testify that in his opinion, based upon narcoanalysis, the
defendants were sane at the time of the alleged crime. The Court of
Appeals of New York held on appeal that in claiming the defense of in-
sanity the defendants ". . . were subject to the use of methods set up
objectively by the medical profession for the proper determination of
such claims. . ... l
This same court ten years later in People v. Ford,12 allowed a psychi-
atrist to testify after three interviews that in his opinion the defendant,
being charged with first degree murder, did not have the mental ability
for premeditation. However, the witness was not permitted .to testify
regarding the second interview in which he had administered sodium.,
amytal. The basis for the court's ruling seemed to be that no New York
court had ever permitted such into evidence before.
The dissenting opinion, ably written by Judge Desmond, reasoned
that in all probability the expert had based his conclusion upon all three
interviews regardless of the court's exclusion of the second. Therefore,
continued the dissent, the excluded testimony should have been ad-
mitted since ". . the jury are entitled to all the facts on which the
expert bases his opinion."' 3 The dissent also pointed out that the sole
issue was one of mental condition, the defendant having admitted the
crime prior to the exclusion, and not whether the defendant was guilty
of fabrication. On the basis of this distinction, it seems consistent to
speculate that drugs such as sodium amytal, although not generally
accepted for one purpose, might be acceptable for another.
Of all the truth serum cases, a California case, People v. Jones,
14
appears to be the most controversial. Here the defendant was indicted
for violation of Section 288 of the California Penal Code:
"Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd or
lascivious act ... upon or with the body ... of a child under the
age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to,
or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person
or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony."
Prior California cases had held that this statute required proof of a
10287 N. Y. 389, 39 N. E. 2d 925 (1942).11Id. at 397-98, 39 N. E. 2d at 928.
12304 N. Y. 679, 107 N. E. 2d 595 (1952).
13Id. at 682, 107 N. E. 2d at 597.
"42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P. 2d 38 (1954).
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specific intent. The defense produced a psychiatrist willing to testify
that (1) he had administered sodium pentothol to the defendant for
purposes of interrogation, (2) that it was his opinion based upon the
results of said interview that the defendant was not a sexual deviate and
that he was incapable of having the necessary intent. Because of the
trial court's exclusion of this evidence, the conviction was reversed on
appeal. After ruling that the evidence was admissible as circumstantial
or character evidence' 5 and that the exclusion thereof amounted to re-
versible error, the Supreme Court of California held that the results
of a sodium pentothol examination are only improper ". . if the state-
ments are offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
asserted . . .here the proffered evidence was not the answers of Jones
to certain questions, but the interrogator's expert analysis of those
answers for the purpose of determining whether Jones was a sexual
deviate ... "16
Lindsey v. United States,'7 the first federal case involving sodium
amytal, possibly extends the Jones rationale even further to credibility
and character traits of a prosecuting witness. The defendant was in-
dicted in the District Court of Alaska on three counts of statutory rape
and three counts of sodomy committed on the person of his fifteen year
old adopted daughter. The prosecuting witness testified on direct
examination as to the offenses charged. On cross-examination the de-
fense sought to impeach the state's witness by introducing into evidence
certain letters and an affidavit wherein she had retracted all original
accusations. The prosecution then called a qualified psychiatrist at-
tempting to rehabilitate its witness. The expert testified, over de-
fendant's objection, as to a sodium amytal examination of said witness
upon which he based his opinion that the state's witness had been telling
the truth on direct examination. He testified that the witness was not
a fabricator or liar, and that she could not have gained the information
she had related to him in the examination unless she had personally
experienced such acts. In the process of delivering this testimony the
" Prior to the Jones case, California had followed the orthodox rule that char-
acter must be proved by general reputation. See 42 CALIF. L. REV. 880 (1954).
For contrary views over Jones decision see 102 U. PA. L. REv. 980 (1954) and
103 U. PA. L. REV. 999 (1955).
1642 Cal. 2d at 226, 266 P. 2d at 43 (1954). But see State v. Sinnott, 43 N. J.
Super. 1, 127 A. 2d 424 (1956), where the defendant was convicted of sodomy.
The testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant while under the
influence of sodium pentothol was refused by the trial court. The record indicates
the psychiatrist would have testified that the examinee exhibited no manifestations
of homosexual perversions, nor was he a sexual deviate. The Superior Court of
New Jersey in affirming the conviction expressly rejected the Jones decision, ad-
hering to the orthodox rule pertaining to character evidence, see note 15 supra.
The court further maintained that the use of narcoanalysis should be limited
to issues of insanity.
" 237 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956).
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psychiatrist was permitted to explain the use and operation of the truth
serum test (actually referring to it as such), to explain that its effect
would prevent this witness from falsifying, and finally, to-play an actual
tape recording of the interview to the jury. The court instructed the
jury to consider the recording only as corroborating the testimony of the
state's witness. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision because prior consistent statements are not ad-
missible ". . except in cases where it affirmatively appears that the
prior consistent statement was made at a time when the declarant had
no motive to fabricate."'' 3 The court rejected the government's con-
tention that sodium amytal would destroy the witness' ability and mo-
tive to fabricate, thus adhering to the current weight of authority that
sodium amytal, when used as a truth drug, is neither trustworthy nor
reliable.
Although the introduction of the same testimony in relation to credi-
bility was considered, the court specifically declined to make any ruling
thereon. The court did comment that ".. . [t] here has been ... an in-
creasing tendency to allow expert psychiatric opinion testimony as to
the credibility and character traits of a witness ... and the need is said
to be especially great in prosecutions for rape where the guilt of the
accused is often dependent solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of
an under-age girl."' 91
After assuming arguendo that the expert opinions, based upon
sodium amytal examinations, would be admissible for limited purposes.
i.e., credibility, the court stated that the playing of the tape recording to
the jury would amount to reversible error because of the difficulty that
it would have in properly evaluating the evidence. The court criticized
both the fact that the expert witness in testifying had referred to the
drug as Truth Serum, and, a fortiori, that said expert was permitted
to expound upon the pseudoscientificus aspect of the drug whereby the
examinee was bound to tell the truth.
Whether the courts come to embrace the liberal Jones attitude or
not, the logical inference to be drawn is that the propounder of such
evidence would greatly increase the possibility of its admission relating
to issues of insanity and credibility if reference to such terms as "Truth,"
"Test," "Truth-Test," "Truth Serum," were completely abandoned and
"Id. at 895. This seems to be the prevailing rule, 58 Am. JUR., Witnesses
§ 825 (1948) ; 4 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1126 (1940). North Carolina is contra.
STANSBURY, EVIDENCE §§ 51, 52 (1946).
"
0Id. at 897. Also see United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (1950), aff'd,
185 F. 2d 822 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 948 (1951) ; State v. Armstrong, 232
N. C. 727, 62 S. E. 2d 50 (1950) ; 59 YALE L. J. 1324 (1950) ; 3 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE §§ 924(a), 997 (1940) ; 26 IND. L. J. 98 (1950) ; 39 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S.
750 (1949).
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if the pseudoscientificus aspect were never mentioned or expounded dur-
ing the trial.
It is also apparent that the possibility of admission would be in-
creased if narcoanalysis were included in a long term examination as
opposed to one or two brief interviews. This would afford the expert
other data on which to base his opinion, thus constructing a sounder
foundation and diverting the spot-light which now seems to be focused
on the reliability of truth drugs. 20
In conclusion, narcoanalysis seems to be generally recognized by the
courts and favored by legal writers when utilized in cases of insanity.
There is conflict, however, in relation to milder mental conditions. Some
courts seem to be willing to extend the use of such drugs into the area
of credibility and character evidence both of the accused and of the
witness; while others, as indicated, are not so willing. In addition, local
rules pertaining to exclusion of evidence will continue to be an im-
portant variant in regard to the use and acceptance of narcoanalysis, in
that such rules will encourage greater court discretion.
J. N. GOLDIN1G.
Guardian and Ward-Dissent by an Incompetent Widow Through
Her Guardian
The guardian of an incompetent widow has many problems, a few
of which may best be pointed out in a hypothetical situation. As-
sume a seventy-year old incompetent widow has a personal estate of
$100,000.00. The husband left no children or collateral heirs. His
estate, valued at $500,000.00, is predominantly personalty such as stock
in his family corporation. Under his will the widow is to receive the
income from one fourth of this estate for life. The residue of the estate
is devised to what had been the widow's favorite charity before she
became incompetent. She did not make a will while she was competent.
She has a brother living who has not seen her for 10 years. What
should the widow's guardian do in regard to the will-should he dis-
sent for her, or should he elect for her to take under the will? What
standard should govern him in making this deicsion? As her brothhr
will be her heir upon her death,' how can the guardian be sure that he
has protected himself against suit by the brother since upon her death
intestate the brother would have an interest sufficient to sue?2
"State v. Sinnott, 43 N. J. Super. 1, 127 A. 2d 424 (1956); STANSBURY,
EVMENCE § 136 (1946).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1, Rule 5 (1950).
- N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). The amount that the brother would receive
upon his sister's death would very possibly bear a direct relationship to the amount
which the widow received from her husband's estate.
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